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Abstract 24 
 25 
The impact of anxiety-provoking stimuli on the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; 26 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), and response inhibition more generally, 27 
is currently unclear. Participants completed four SARTs embedded with picture stimuli of two 28 
levels of emotion (negative or neutral) and two levels of task-relevance (predictive or non-29 
predictive of imminent No-Go stimuli). Negative pictures had a small but detectable adverse 30 
effect on performance regardless of their task-relevance. Overall, response times and rates of 31 
commission errors were more dependent upon the predictive value (relevance) of the pictures than 32 
their attention-capturing nature (i.e., negative valence). The findings raise doubt over whether 33 
anxiety improves response inhibition, and also lend support to a response strategy perspective of 34 
SART performance, as opposed to a mindlessness or mind-wandering explanation. 35 
 36 
Keywords: Anxiety; Attention; Emotion; Sustained attention; Response inhibition; SART; Speed–accuracy 37 
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1. Introduction 39 
 40 
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) is a Go/No-Go response task requiring motor 41 
inhibition (Robertson et al., 1997). In the SART subjects make repetitive responses to Go stimuli on 42 
approximately 90% of trials, but have to withhold responses to rarer No-Go stimuli. The speeded repetitive 43 
responding in the SART results in the development of a feed-forward ballistic motor program (Head & 44 
Helton, 2013; Robertson et al., 1997). Indeed, commission errors are more likely in the SART when 45 
responses to Go stimuli are faster suggesting a trade-off between the speed of response to Go stimuli and the 46 
ability to withhold responding to No-Go stimuli (Helton, 2009). The SART provides a measure of the ability 47 
to inhibit pre-potent motor responses. 48 
Robinson and colleagues (2013) in a prior study using the SART demonstrated that the administration of 49 
task-irrelevant electric shocks to participants during the SART reduced commission errors without affecting 50 
response times to Go stimuli (Robinson, Krimsky, & Grillon, 2013). A number of factors influence SART 51 
performance by shifting the participants’ emphasis on speed at the cost of accuracy or vice versa (Head & 52 
Helton, 2013; Head & Helton, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012; Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & 53 
Smilek, 2013), but in this case the administration of shocks improved response inhibition with no evidence 54 
of a response strategy shift. To further examine this finding, Wilson and colleagues (2015) developed a 55 
SART in which pictures of spiders and neutral stimuli served as the Go or No-Go stimuli (both combinations 56 
were used). They compared this modified spider picture SART with the original SART in which the Go and 57 
No-Go stimuli are the numbers 1–9. Since spiders are anxiety provoking stimuli (Gerdes, Uhl, & Alpers, 58 
2009), Wilson and colleagues predicted in line with Robinson et al. (2013) that the spider SART in 59 
comparison to the number SART would result in fewer commission errors but at no cost to response time. 60 
This prediction was correct. However, the authors also proposed that spider stimuli may simply be more 61 
salient and consequently identified more quickly. Researchers have suggested people may have the ability to 62 
recognise spiders extremely quickly (Flykt, 2005; LoBue, 2010). Smallwood (2013) found that making the 63 
No-Go number stimuli red versus the Go number stimuli black improved accuracy at no cost to response 64 
time in the number SART.  65 
The impact of affect provoking stimuli on the SART, or response inhibition more generally, is unclear. In 66 
terms of tasks involving fine motor control, exposure to negative picture stimuli has been shown to increase 67 
error after short exposure and increase speed following long exposure (Coombes, Janelle, & Duley, 2005). In 68 
cognitive tasks, negative emotional stimuli have been found to impair task performance by competing with 69 
attentional resources (Helton & Russell, 2011; Ossowski, Malinen, & Helton, 2011). Helton and Russell 70 
(2011) observed that negative picture stimuli led to significantly more misses (the equivalent to omission 71 
errors in a SART) compared to neutral picture stimuli and a no-picture control in a vigilance task. In a task 72 
where participants made multiple shoot or no-shoot decisions, similar to the way SART participants make 73 
responses to Go and No-Go stimuli, stress induced through the use of a shock belt led to more commission 74 
errors (Patton, 2014). Unlike the shocks in Robinson and colleagues’ (2013) study, shocks in Patton’s study 75 
resulted in impaired ability to inhibit responses. However, in this case the shocks were not task-irrelevant but 76 
tied to the task-stimuli themselves; the shocks were task-relevant. 77 
The role of affect provoking stimuli on response inhibition clearly warrants further exploration. In the 78 
current experiment we used picture stimuli embedded into SARTs in a factorial design combining two levels 79 
of emotion (negative vs. neutral pictures) and two levels of task-relevance (predictive—task-relevant vs. 80 
non-predictive—task-irrelevant). In our SARTs, the pictures either did predict or did not predict the 81 
imminent onset of No-Go stimuli. In one condition, all pictures reliably predicted the occurrence of No-Go 82 
stimuli whereas in another condition they occurred randomly, before Go or No-Go stimuli. In addition, the 83 
pictures were either rated high for negative valence and arousal or rated neutral for valence and arousal. 84 
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Participants performed four SARTs: predictive–negative, predictive–neutral, non-predictive–negative, and 85 
non-predictive–neutral. 86 
The experimental design allows us to determine whether the effect of stimulus valence is moderated by 87 
the task relevance (predictive vs. not predictive). While we expected that negative picture stimuli would lead 88 
would lead to fewer commission errors, it was not clear whether valence would influence the impact that 89 
task-relevance might have, or the direction that any such effect might be. If stimulus valence affects rates of 90 
commission errors regardless of the task relevance of the picture stimuli, a statistically reliable emotion main 91 
effect will be found. If the effect of stimulus valence is moderated by task relevance an emotion x relevance 92 
interaction effect will be evident. There is less uncertainty about the effects of task relevance on commission 93 
errors. In previous studies, predictive warning stimuli improved SART performance (Finkbeiner, Wilson, 94 
Russell, & Helton, 2014; Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011; Helton, Head, & Kemp, 2011) through reducing 95 
commission errors as well as shortening response times. The same findings are expected here. That is, there 96 
is expected to be main effects of task-relevance, whereby task-relevant stimuli will reduce commission errors 97 
and shorten response times. 98 
Self-report measures were included to verify that that the negative picture SARTs effectively elicited 99 
negative emotional reactions in participants relative to neutral picture SARTs. In addition, the inclusion of 100 
the self-report measures was to address an ongoing debate in the SART literature. While there is agreement 101 
that speed–accuracy trade-offs are prevalent in the SART, there is an ongoing debate around what causes the 102 
trade-off. One explanation for errors in the SART is that participants become bored and their attention to the 103 
task wanes, leading to a state of mindlessness (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson et 104 
al., 1997) or mind-wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). From the inattention perspective, self-reported 105 
decreases in task-related and task-unrelated thoughts (mindlessness) or increases in task-unrelated thoughts 106 
(mind-wandering) are often taken as evidence of perceptual decoupling. 107 
Alternatively, it is possible to explain the trade-off between the risk of responding to No-Go stimuli and 108 
speed of response to Go stimuli without invoking attention, mindlessness, mind-wandering or perceptual 109 
decoupling at all (e.g. Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009; Peebles & Bothell, 2004). When 89% of trials are Go 110 
trials requiring a speeded response and only 11% are No-Go trials, participants decide that the benefits of 111 
speed on 89% of trials outweigh the costs of reducing speed on all (100%) trials, which is necessary to avoid 112 
making the occasional commission error to a No-Go stimulus. Indeed Peebles and Bothell (2004) presented a 113 
model based on the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational architecture (ACT-R; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), 114 
which incorporates two competing response strategies. One strategy favours speed at the expense of accuracy 115 
(encode and ‘click’) while the other strategy is slower but more accurate (encode and ‘check’). The strategy 116 
choice is dynamic, and participants balance the utility of each strategy from trial to trial within the SART. 117 
For example, after a fast correct Go response, the utility of “click” is reinforced, while a commission error 118 
will see the utility of “check” enhanced. The model proposed by Peebles and Bothell successfully predicts 119 
the speed–accuracy trade-off and other response time data in the SART (Helton, 2009; Helton, Weil, 120 
Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010). 121 
Concerning the self-report stress scale, two items that are of particular interest to this debate are the 122 
measures of task-related thoughts and task-unrelated thoughts, as these measures are central to the two main 123 
competing theories. From an inattention perspective, increased task-unrelated thoughts and/or decreased 124 
task-related thoughts should be seen in the condition where SART commission errors are highest, because 125 
mind-wandering and mindlessness are thought to cause commission errors (Robertson et al., 1997). On the 126 
other hand, those advocating a simple response strategy perspective do not necessarily expect high task-127 
unrelated thoughts/low task-related thoughts in the SART with the highest commission errors, because this 128 
view does not attribute errors to failures of conscious attention per se. From a response strategy perspective 129 
if subjects are sensitive to stimulus contingencies and relative probabilities of Go and No-Go stimuli then 130 
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task performance should depend much more on the predictive value of warning cues than on the attention-131 
capturing potential of the stimuli or reports of conscious focus. 132 
 133 
2. Methods 134 
 135 
2.1 Participants 136 
 137 
Forty-two (16 male, 26 female) undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury in 138 
Christchurch, New Zealand, participated as part of a course laboratory class requirement. They ranged in age 139 
between 17 and 53 years (M = 21.5, SD = 12.3). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  140 
 141 
2.2 Materials and procedure 142 
 143 
Participants were tested in individual workstation cubicles. They were given an information sheet and a 144 
consent form which they signed. Wrist watches were removed and mobile phones were switched off. 145 
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm in front of Phillips 225B2 LCD computer screens (1680 x 146 
1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) that were mounted at eye level. Participants’ head movements were not 147 
restrained. Stimuli presentation, response accuracy, and timing were achieved using E-prime 2.0 software 148 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 149 
The tasks were modified versions of the SART (Robertson et al., 1997). They required participants to 150 
monitor the screen for digit stimuli, responding by pressing the spacebar to frequently-occurring Go stimuli 151 
(the digits 1–9, excluding 3) and withholding responses to infrequent No-Go stimuli (the digit 3). Go stimuli 152 
occurred with a probability of 0.89 and No-Go stimuli occurred with a probability of 0.11. Participants were 153 
told to emphasise speed and accuracy equally. Digits varied in size, were randomly selected from point sizes 154 
48, 72, 94, 100, and 120, and were all of Arial font. Each SART consisted of 225 trials. In addition to the 155 
digit stimuli, which occurred on every trial, picture stimuli were also incorporated into the SARTs. These 156 
were displayed on 11% of trials (the same amount as No-Go trials) and their presentation always came 157 
immediately before digit stimuli. On non-picture trials (89% of trials) a mask consisting of a ring with a 158 
diagonal line through it firstly appeared on screen for 450 ms. On picture trials (11% of trials) a picture 159 
appeared for 250 ms, followed by the mask for 200 ms. Following this for both trial types, a digit stimulus 160 
appeared for 250 ms. Finally, the mask was displayed on screen for 750 ms (see Fig. 1). Responses were 161 
recorded up to 1000 ms following stimulus onset. The onset-to-onset interval was 1450 ms and each SART 162 
was approximately 5.4 mins in duration. The picture stimuli were selected from the International Affective 163 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). The IAPS contains picture stimuli rated for both 164 
arousal and valence on a 9-point scale. Two sets of picture stimuli (N = 25 for each) were used: a neutral set 165 
and a negative set. Pictures selected for the neutral set were rated as being neutral in valence (M = 5.02, SD = 166 
.13) and low in arousal (M = 3.04, SD = .59), while pictures selected for the negative set were rated as being 167 
negative in valence (M = 1.79, SD = .33) and high in arousal (M = 6.64, SD = .53). Two of the SARTs 168 
contained neutral pictures (e.g., a towel and a satellite) while the other two SARTs contained negative 169 
pictures (e.g., a mortally injured person and a gun pointing at the participant). Pictures spanned the width and 170 
height of the screen. A second manipulation was the predictive nature of the picture stimuli. In two of the 171 
SARTs (“predictive”—task-relevant), pictures always came before No-Go stimuli, effectively serving as 172 
predictors of No-Go stimuli on 100% (25/25) of the No-Go trials. In the other two SARTs (“non-173 
predictive”—task-irrelevant) the pictures had equal likelihood of occurring before any of the digit stimuli, 1-174 
9. Before the experimental tasks began, participants completed a practice session to familiarise themselves 175 
with the task. This provided verbal feedback on accuracy, contained 18 trials and was approximately 40 sec 176 
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in duration. No picture stimuli were included here and it was essentially identical to a typical digit SART. 177 
Participants completed all four SARTs (predictive–negative; predictive–neutral; non-predictive–negative; 178 
non-predictive–neutral) in a repeated measures design. Half of participants began with a SART containing 179 
negative pictures and the other half began with a SART containing neutral pictures, and similarly half of 180 
participants’ first SART contained task-relevant (predictive) stimuli while the other half of participants’ first 181 
SART had task-irrelevant (non-predictive) stimuli. Counterbalancing was used and participants were 182 
randomly assigned to pre-determined task orders. In order to prevent potential confusion for participants by 183 
requiring them to switch back and forth between the two different levels of task-relevance, participants 184 
always completed either both predictive SARTs or both non-predictive SARTs first. Alternating between the 185 
two different emotional valences instead of the two different prediction levels was done to minimise the 186 
chances of participants becoming confused as to what the pictures indicated (i.e., whether a No-Go stimulus 187 
was certain to follow or not). Participants were informed of the predictive nature (either predictive or non-188 
predictive) of each forthcoming SART immediately before they began that SART. They were not told 189 
whether it would contain negative or neutral pictures—they were however told at the beginning of the 190 
experiment that each task contained either negative or neutral pictures. 191 
 192 
 193 
Fig. 1 Schematics depicting examples of trials for the predictive (top) and non-predictive condition (bottom). 194 
 195 
Accepted Manuscript 
(25th April, 2016) doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.04.011 Consciousness and Cognition 
  Volume 42 
  May 2016 
  Pages 358-365 
   
Self-report measures were also used to assess participants’ stress and emotional response to each task. A 196 
Stress Scale questionnaire (Blakely, 2014; Sellers, Helton, Näswall, Funke, & Knott, 2014) was completed 197 
by participants immediately following each task (four times in all). This consisted of 11 Likert-scale items 198 
with a scale of 0 (“very low”) to 100 (“very high”). These individual items were each based on factors from 199 
the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews, Joyner, Gilliland, Huggins, & Falconer, 1999). 200 
The whole experiment took approximately 30 mins to complete. 201 
 202 
3. Results 203 
 204 
Results from 2 participants were excluded as they made excessive commission and omission errors 205 
throughout each of the tasks, indicating that they had failed to follow task instructions. 206 
 207 
3.1 Anxiety induced by picture stimuli 208 
 209 
To check that the negative stimuli were indeed anxiety provoking for participants, the subjective ratings 210 
of Tense and Unhappy were examined. Ratings of Tense were significantly higher for the negative condition 211 
(M = 52.86, SD = 23.64) than the neutral condition (M = 33.43, SD = 22.66), F(1, 39) = 37.21, p < .01, ηp
2 = 212 
.49. Ratings of Unhappiness were also significantly higher for the negative condition (M = 55.49, SD = 213 
24.61) than the neutral condition (M = 30.25, SD = 21.53), F(1, 39) = 45.18, p < .01, ηp
2 = .54. These 214 
findings were expected and supported the idea that the negative stimuli induced anxiety in participants, 215 
consistent with the IAPS (Lang et al., 2001). 216 
 217 
3.2 SART performance 218 
 219 
For each subject in each condition, the proportion of commission errors (proportion of No-Go trials where 220 
the stimulus was selected; Fig. 2), omission errors (proportion of Go trials where the stimulus was not 221 
selected; Fig. 3), and the mean correct response times to Go stimuli (Fig. 4) were calculated.  222 
Separate 2 (emotional valence: negative vs. neutral) x 2 (task-relevance: predictive vs. non-predictive) 223 
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on each of the three performance measures. These were then 224 
followed up with paired sample t-tests when appropriate. 225 
For errors of commission, there was a significant main effect of task-relevance, F(1, 39) = 125.23, p < 226 
.01, ηp
2 = .76, with significantly more errors made for the non-predictive condition (M = .51, SD = .21) than 227 
the predictive condition (M = .14, SD = .11). There was also a significant valence main effect, F(1, 39) = 228 
4.02, p = .05, ηp
2 = .09, with more commission errors occurring in the negative (M = .35, SD = .16) than the 229 
neutral condition (M = .31, SD = .13). There was no interaction effect, p > .05. 230 
For errors of omission, there was a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 39) = 7.42, p = .01, ηp
2 = .16, 231 
with more omission errors made in the negative condition (M = .01, SD = .02) than the neutral condition (M 232 
= .01, SD = .01). There was no main effect for task-relevance, p > .05, however there was a significant 233 
interaction effect between valence and task-relevance, F(1, 39) = 7.93, p = .01, ηp
2 = .17. A paired t-test 234 
revealed that there were significantly more omission errors made in the negative valence (M = .02, SD = .02) 235 
than the neutral valence (M = .01, SD = .01) when pictures were non-predictive, t(39) = 3.27, p < .01, d = 236 
.52. To determine if this effect was limited to picture trials or non-picture trials within the non-predictive 237 
condition, a further paired t-test was conducted. This revealed that the effect of increased omission errors 238 
was limited to picture trials within the non-predictive condition; there were significantly more errors of 239 
omission made following the presentation of negative pictures (M = .03, SD  = .03) than the presentation of 240 
neutral pictures (M = .01, SD = .02), t(39) = 3.56, p < .01, d = .56.  241 
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For response time, there was a significant main effect of prediction, F(1, 39) = 146.80, p < .01, ηp
2 = .79, 242 
with response times to Go stimuli faster in the predictive condition (M = 264.12 ms, SD = 58.11) than the 243 
non-predictive condition (M = 370.16 ms, SD = 60.63). There was no main effect of valence and no 244 
interaction effect, p > .05. 245 
 246 
Fig. 2 Mean proportion of errors of commission (proportion of No-Go trials where the stimulus was 247 
selected) for each of the four SARTs. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 248 
 249 
 250 
 251 
Fig. 3 Mean proportion of errors of omission (proportion of Go trials where the stimulus was not 252 
selected) for each of the four SARTs. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 253 
 254 
 255 
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 256 
Fig. 4 Mean response time for Go trials (ms) for each of the four SARTs. Error bars are standard 257 
errors of the mean. 258 
 259 
3.3 Correlations between response time and commission errors 260 
 261 
Correlations between response time and errors of commission for each of the four SARTs were 262 
investigated using simple Pearson product correlation coefficients (N = 40 in all cases). There was a 263 
significant negative correlation between response time and commission errors for the non-predictive–264 
negative SART, r = -.72, p < .01, as well as the non-predictive–neutral SART, r = -.58, p < .01. Conversely, 265 
for the predictive–negative SART, r = -.04, p > .05, and the predictive–neutral SART, r = -.10, p > .05, there 266 
was no evidence of speed–accuracy trade-off.   267 
 268 
3.4 Subjective state 269 
 270 
For each subject in each valence x prediction condition, we calculated the average scores on each of the 271 
11 Stress Scale items (Table 1). As with the behavioural results, separate 2 (emotional valence: negative vs. 272 
neutral) x 2 (task-relevance: predictive vs. non-predictive) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on 273 
each of the 11 scale items. These were then followed up with paired sample t-tests when appropriate. 274 
For both task-related thoughts and task-unrelated thoughts there were no significant effects, p > .05. 275 
There was a significant main effect of valence for self-related thoughts, with self-related thoughts 276 
significantly higher for the neutral condition than the negative condition, F(1, 39) = 6.22, p = .02, ηp
2 = .14. 277 
As noted in section 3.1 above, there were also significant main effects of valence for both tense and 278 
unhappiness, with both of these items rated significantly higher for the negative condition than the neutral 279 
condition. There was a significant main effect of task-relevance for confidence, with confidence significantly 280 
higher for the predictive condition than the non-predictive condition, F(1, 39) = 30.67, p < .01, ηp
2 = .44. 281 
There were no significant main effects for the remaining items of physical fatigue, mental fatigue, 282 
motivation, task interest, concentration, nor any significant interactions for any of the 11 items, p > .05. 283 
 284 
Table 1 Stress Scale items’ means and standard deviations 
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 Predictive–
Negative 
Predictive–
Neutral 
 Non-predictive–
Negative 
Non-predictive–
Neutral 
Task-related thoughts 67.15 (21.81) 60.00 (18.03)  62.38 (27.62) 62.64 (22.81) 
Task-unrelated thoughts 37.13 (25.74) 43.62 (21.36)  39.25 (27.54) 43.02 (28.35) 
Self-related thoughtsv 30.92 (24.01) 39.88 (24.87)  36.13 (27.49) 41.08 (27.45) 
Physical fatigue 43.25 (26.01) 45.50 (24.57)  42.75 (28.33) 41.78 (23.64) 
Mental fatigue 61.25 (23.45) 61.68 (25.16)  60.50 (29.50) 53.95 (25.91) 
Tensev 51.13 (25.13) 30.38 (24.71)  54.60 (27.00) 36.48 (25.69) 
Unhappyv 55.95 (26.80) 29.25 (25.00)  55.03 (27.54) 31.25 (23.91) 
Motivation 51.13 (24.61) 57.45 (26.38)  53.63 (29.00) 53.40 (27.99) 
Task interest 39.75 (25.14) 36.38 (25.19)  42.73 (25.70) 35.75 (27.45) 
Concentration 63.72 (24.35) 60.00 (25.12)  63.20 (24.21) 58.50 (26.17) 
Confidence p 61.07 (24.61) 65.37 (21.30)  46.43 (22.92) 50.68 (24.03) 
Note. v denotes a significant valence main effect, p denotes a significant prediction main effect, p < .05. 
 285 
4. Discussion 286 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the impact of task-relevant (predictive) and task-287 
irrelevant (non-predictive) negative and neutral picture stimuli on SART performance. If negative stimuli 288 
inherently and regardless of task relevance improve response accuracy with no cost to response speed, then a 289 
main effect for emotional valence (negative vs. neutral pictures) would be found for errors of commission, 290 
but with no increase in response time. Alternatively if the effect of stimulus valence on commission errors is 291 
contingent on task-relevance, a significant interaction would be found between emotion and task-relevance 292 
in which negative valence results in increased commission errors with task relevant stimuli and reduces 293 
errors when task-irrelevant. In the present experiment, the effect was different to the possibilities we had 294 
primarily proposed. The inclusion of negative picture stimuli actually resulted in more commission errors, 295 
not fewer. There was moreover no evidence of an interaction. Although the effect itself was small (ηp
2 = .09), 296 
its direction may mean Wilson et al.’s (2015) alternative explanation that the spider stimuli improved 297 
commission errors because spiders are highly salient and detected quickly, not because they were negatively 298 
arousing (tension–anxiety inducing), is more plausible. The current findings are consistent with Patton’s 299 
(2014) finding that stress, in that case through task-relevant shocks, caused firearm operators to make more 300 
friendly fire errors (i.e., errors of commission) in a shoot/don’t shoot simulation. Robinson et al.’s (2013) 301 
finding that the threat of task-irrelevant shocks improves commission errors is harder to reconcile with the 302 
present findings. It could be that it is not the negative arousing nature of the stimuli, but the actual perceived 303 
threat (possible pain) of the stimuli that improves response inhibition. It is possible that the differences in the 304 
method which anxiety was induced between the current study and the previous studies discussed here may 305 
also account for some of the discrepancies. The present pictures based on self-report resulted in more 306 
unhappiness and more tension, but perhaps they were not perceived as personal threats. Nevertheless this 307 
requires further research.  308 
The negative pictures in the non-predictive task significantly increased errors of omission (failures to 309 
respond to the Go stimuli), relative to the other three tasks. This finding is similar to previous studies using 310 
low Go, high No-Go stimuli detection tasks (vigilance tasks), where errors of omission also increase when 311 
task-irrelevant negative picture stimuli are inserted into the task (Helton & Russell, 2011; Ossowski, et al., 312 
2011; although see Flood, Näswall, & Helton, 2014). This could be because the task-irrelevant negative 313 
pictures directly capture attention. Negative picture stimuli may also trigger further distracting thoughts 314 
(Ossowski et al., 2011; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). There was, however, no evidence 315 
from the self-report measures of the negative picture stimuli triggering more conscious thoughts (either task-316 
related or task-unrelated thoughts). Indeed, negative pictures actually resulted in significantly fewer self-317 
related thoughts. Perhaps the impact of the negative picture stimuli on omission errors is not because they 318 
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trigger further thoughts about them, but instead because these pictures induce suppression of further thoughts 319 
about them (especially thoughts about them in the context of the individual). Suppression of these thoughts 320 
may demand executive control which competes with the ongoing task demands for attention (McVay & 321 
Kane, 2010). Another possibility is that suppression of these thoughts involves the same kinds of resources 322 
as suppressing a prepotent motor response, given that negative pictures also led to more commission errors. 323 
Further investigation of this is required. 324 
 In regards to task-relevance we predicted a main effect, in which task-relevant picture stimuli would 325 
reduce commission errors. This was indeed the case. The effect of predictive stimuli on the SART is well 326 
known and lends general support for a strategic perspective of the SART (Finkbeiner, et al., 2014; Helton et 327 
al., 2011a; 2011b). Participants take active advantage of any cues which are helpful in withholding responses 328 
to the No-Go stimuli. In regards to the role of conscious thoughts on commission errors in the SART, there 329 
were no significant differences between the predictive, where commission errors were relatively rare, and the 330 
non-predictive conditions, where commission errors were much more prevalent. This lends some support to 331 
the perspective that the causative impact of either the lack of conscious thoughts (mindlessness) or high 332 
reports of task-unrelated thoughts (mind-wandering) on actual SART performance is highly overestimated 333 
by many researchers (Smallwood, McSpadden & Schooler, 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). SART 334 
performance may be better explained by mechanisms like Peebles’ and Bothell’s (2004) dynamic response 335 
strategy model, which does not need to account for either conscious states or the contents of consciousness. 336 
SART commission errors are the result of two task demands, to go as fast as possible in response to Go 337 
stimuli yet to be accurate in withholding to No-Go stimuli, that are essentially impossible to simultaneously 338 
satisfy without forewarning. If the nature of the stimuli is cued accurately, the participant has more time to 339 
respond overall and there is, therefore, no penalty to perform encode and check, instead of simply encode 340 
and click. Researchers have found simple response delays also markedly reduce commission errors (Head & 341 
Helton, 2013; Seli et al., 2012). 342 
Comparing the respective impacts of task-relevance and valence on SART performance shows that task-343 
relevance had a more substantial effect. This was evidenced by significant main effects of task-relevance on 344 
both commission errors and response time (versus a significant main effect of valence on commission errors 345 
only) and greater effect sizes for the task-relevance effects. Essentially, task-relevance accounted for much 346 
more of the variance than valence in both the commission error and the response time results. 347 
The present experiment casts some doubts regarding the likelihood that tense arousal (tension) or anxiety 348 
itself improves response inhibition. It may be that the mechanism needs to be more specific, such as the 349 
presence of actual personal threat, but this requires further research. Regardless the present results do provide 350 
more evidence in support of a response strategy perspective of the SART.  351 
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